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HOW INSTITUTIONS AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES AFFECT 
WAGES: A CROSS-NATIONAL STUDY OF CALL CENTERS 
ROSEMARY BATT and HIROATSU NOHARA* 
This paper, drawing on a 2003-2006 establishment-level survey of 1,819 call centers 
in 15 countries, examines effects of industrial relations institutions and employer strate 
gies on wage variation across coordinated, liberal, and emerging market economies. 
The authors find several contradictory patterns, which confirm theoretical predictions 
for some countries and contradict them for others, suggesting diverse institutional 
reactions to the emergence of a new economic activity. Consistent with prior research, 
Denmark, France, and Sweden exhibit patterns of low wage dispersion and no union 
wage premium, and the United States, Canada, and emerging market economies ex 
hibit quite high levels of dispersion. Contrary to prior research, Austria and Germany 
resemble the United States in their levels of wage dispersion, while the United Kingdom 
resembles the coordinated market group. Finally, employer strategies of outsourcing 
and market segmentation explain within-country wage variation in most countries, 
suggesting considerable flexibility in wage setting at the establishment level. 
TP he literature on comparative political -* 
economy has categorized economies 
according to the level of coordination of 
their national institutions. The most fa 
miliar framework distinguishes between 
coordinated and liberal market economies 
(Hall and Soskice 2000). It builds, in part, 
on industrial relations (IR) research, which 
distinguishes between more centralized and 
coordinated collective bargaining systems, 
characteristic of continental Europe and 
Scandinavia, and more decentralized ones, 
such as those in the United States and United 
Kingdom. These differences in industrial re 
*Rosemary Batt is Alice H. Cook Associate Professor 
of Women and Work, School of Industrial and Labor 
Relations, Cornell University, and Hiroatsu Nohara is 
Senior Research Fellow, Laboratory of Labour Econom 
ics and Industrial Sociology (LEST-CNRS), Aix-Marseille 
University, Aix-en-Provence, France. 
A data appendix with additional results, and copies 
of the computer programs used to generate the results 
presented in the paper, are available from the first author 
at rb41@cornell.edu. 
lations systems have shaped patterns of wage 
determination, with more centralized systems 
producing relatively low wage dispersion and 
low union wage differentials compared to 
more decentralized systems. 
Pressures of globalization and product 
market deregulation, however, have eroded 
centralized bargaining structures in many 
countries, allowing employers greater leeway 
to alter business and compensation strategies. 
This raises the question of whether current 
wage determination patterns are consistent 
with past empirical findings. Some argue 
that countries with centralized IR systems are 
converging toward a decentralized model, 
which would suggest that wage dispersion and 
union wage premia in these countries more 
closely resemble the patterns in liberal market 
economies than they did in the past. Others 
argue that nationally specific and divergent 
patterns continue to be salient. A third po 
sition is that processes of convergence and 
divergence have occurred simultaneously, 
resulting in greater convergence in employ 
ment and wage practices across countries as 
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534 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
well as greater divergence within countries 
than was characteristic of the past (Katz and 
Darbishire2000). 
We explore this debate by drawing on 
evidence from call center operations. This 
context is appropriate because call centers 
employ a growing proportion of the work 
force in most countries and are emblematic of 
new economic activities that rely on advanced 
information technologies (IT). As such, they 
are mobile operations that have challenged 
collective bargaining institutions or escaped 
them by operating outside traditional indus 
try boundaries. In addition, we incorporate 
into this study evidence from emerging mar 
ket economies, which typically have not been 
included in studies of comparative political 
economy and industrial relations. Including 
these countries is important because the call 
center sector, like other IT sectors, includes 
international competition between advanced 
and emerging markets. 
We focus on two questions. First, does the 
degree of centralization in industrial relations 
systems shape the level of wage dispersion 
in new service activities such as call centers? 
Second, what is the relative importance of 
these institutions and employer strategies in 
explaining wage variation within countries? 
These two sets of factors are linked because 
the degree of centralization influences the 
extent of flexibility in wage setting at estab 
lishment levels. As centralized systems break 
down, employers may have new opportunities 
for wage setting at the organizational level 
(Brown, Marginson, and Walsh 2003). Thus, 
employer strategies are prime candidates 
for explaining patterns of wage dispersion 
within countries, over-and-above the effects 
of unions. Our wage analyses also take into 
account variation in the human capital re 
quirements of these jobs. We draw on data 
from 15 countries in the global call center 
project (Holman, Batt, and Holtgrewe 2007), 
which used an identical establishment-level 
survey of one occupational group for each 
country in the study. 
Prior Literature 
We begin by briefly summarizing the past 
literature on how differences in national 
industrial relations systems affect the level 
of wage dispersion within countries and the 
extent to which countries in this study have 
experienced decentralization in these insti 
tutions in recent years. We then discuss the 
relationship between employer strategies and 
wages and how differences across industrial 
relations systems are likely to moderate that 
relationship. 
The literature on industrial relations and 
wage determination generally has shown 
that unions raise the wages of workers they 
represent and lower overall wage dispersion 
within countries. However, the magnitude 
of these effects, and the effect of unions on 
non-union workers, depend on the specific 
characteristics of industrial relations systems. 
Of particular importance is the level of cen 
tralization in bargaining (whether it occurs 
at the firm, industry, or higher level) and 
coordination among employers, among trade 
unions, and between employers and unions 
(Calmfors and Driffil 2002; Blau and Kahn 
1999; OECD 2004). 
Three factors, in particular, shape the level 
of centralization: union density, the level at 
which collective bargaining occurs, and the 
use of "extension clauses" that extend the 
negotiated wage to all employers in a sector 
or in the economy?regardless of whether 
they participate in negotiations or have union 
members as employees. Centralized systems 
that score high on these factors 
are more 
inclusive because they extend bargaining 
coverage to larger proportions of the work 
force. A high statutory minimum wage but 
tresses these effects. 
In more decentralized systems, wage 
bargaining occurs at the firm level or 
lower, with considerable wage variation 
across industries, across firms, and across 
establishments in the same firm. Unions 
seek to compress wage dispersion by rais 
ing the wages of lower-skilled workers, 
but their ability to influence the wages of 
non-union workers depends importantly 
on union density and union power. High 
union density creates a union "threat ef 
fect," providing incentives for non-union 
employers to match union wage levels and 
thus reducing overall dispersion and the 
union/non-union wage gap. 
HOW INSTITUTIONS AND BUSINESS STRATEGIES AFFECT WAGES 535 
In more centralized systems, union den 
sity is typically high, bargaining occurs at 
the industry (sectoral) level or higher, and 
coverage is extended to a large percentage 
of the work force, through either manda 
tory or voluntary compliance mechanisms. 
These systems raise wages at the lower end of 
the distribution while limiting growth at the 
top, thereby compressing wage dispersion; 
and there is no wage premium associated 
with union coverage, because unions have 
an interest in moderating wage demands 
to support high employment. 
This literature has developed four main 
hypotheses. Compared to centralized sys 
tems, decentralized ones are predicted to 
have higher overall wage dispersion, a larger 
union/non-union wage gap, and higher dis 
persion within both the union and the non 
union sectors. In addition, the magnitude 
of dispersion between and within union and 
non-union sectors is expected to be shaped 
by the level of union density (OECD 1997; 
Blau and Kahn 1999; Blanchflower and 
Bryson2002). 
In principle, these predictions should 
hold for new business functions or opera 
tions that emerge as the economy and tech 
nology change; but outcomes depend on 
the specific features of the new economic 
activity, as well as the capacity of IR systems 
to incorporate new enterprises. In the case 
of call centers, most began and continue to 
operate as new business functions within 
established firms?referred to as "in-house" 
centers?so that they are covered by existing 
collective bargaining agreements. These 
agreements typically exist at the firm or 
establishment level in decentralized systems 
and at the firm/industry level in central 
ized systems, preserving the hypothesized 
differences between the two types of sys 
tems. Thus, bargaining coverage of new 
economy employees should reflect the 
collective bargaining system in the sec 
tor in which the firm is located, although 
union density may be lower if unions do 
not actively organize new members there. 
In general, we expect to find higher col 
lective bargaining coverage and lower 
wage dispersion in centralized systems 
than in decentralized ones. 
Current Variation in 
Industrial Relations Systems 
Most countries, however, have experienced 
some level of decentralization in collective 
bargaining institutions in recent years (Katz 
and Darbishire 2000), raising the question 
of whether countries previously classified as 
centralized now more closely resemble liberal 
market economies. To assess the current 
extent of centralization in industrial relations 
institutions, we use five indicators?union 
density, collective bargaining coverage, col 
lective bargaining level, the use of mandatory 
extension clauses, and the level of the statu 
tory minimum wage. Table 1 provides data 
on these indicators, on the OECD measures 
of centralization and coordination (OECD 
1997, 2004), and on our hypothesized 
predictions regarding wage dispersion and 
the union wage effect in each country. As 
a point of departure, we categorize our 15 
countries into three groups based on the prior 
literature (Hall and Soskice 2000)?liberal 
market economies (Canada, Ireland, Israel, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States); 
coordinated economies (Austria, Denmark, 
France, Germany, and Sweden); and emerg 
ing market economies (Brazil, India, Poland, 
South Africa, and South Korea)?and below 
we assess the extent of decentralization in 
their industrial relations institutions. 
Overall, the data show that liberal market 
economies as a group continue to have more 
decentralized bargaining institutions than 
do coordinated economies. In the former 
group, IR institutions are generally decentral 
ized, with relatively low union density and 
bargaining coverage, union negotiations at 
the firm or establishment level, and no pro 
cedures for extending agreements to other 
firms or establishments. Most score a low "1" 
on the OECD centralization and coordina 
tion indices. By contrast, the coordinated 
economies have considerably higher union 
density and bargaining coverage; most have 
collective bargaining at the sector level with 
supplementary firm agreements and score 
3-4 on the OECD indices. Therefore, overall 
we expect differences in wage dispersion and 
the union wage premium between coordi 
nated and liberal market economies in this 
Table 1. Industrial Relations Systems and heir Pr dictedEff c s on Wag s. gj
- a>
Min. Wage Predicted 
Relative to Coord. entral. Deg ee P edicted Union 
Union Bargaining Bargaining Extens oFull-Time I dex? Index?of Wage a e
Country Densitf Coverage" Level Procedure Median 
Earning? 
(OECD) (OECD) Centralization Dispersion Differential 
Liberal 
Market 
Economies 
Canada 28% 32Firm & establish. No 9.5% 1Decentralized HighY s
dominant 
Ireland 38% NA Sector dom Yes 
(voluntary 
51.7% 4 4 Rather Moderate No ^ 
& firm 
compliance) 
centralized D 
Israel6 35% 56Fi m 8c establish. No 47.5% A Decentralized HighYes^ 
dominant H 
U.K. 31% 36  Firm-level No 43.2% 11Decentralized High Yes, butF 
dominant 
weak |?< 
U.S. 13% 14% Firm & establish. No 32.2% 1 1 Decentralized High Yes t> 
dominant 
q 
Coordinated Ec nomies ?^ 
Austria 37% 97% Sector Yes 
(legal 
& No (but 3 4 Centralized Low No Ed dominant autom tic) bargained in O 
sectoral c ntracts) ^ 
Denmark 74% 83% Sector dominantYes No (but 4 2 Cent lized Low No ^
& firm 
(voluntary 
bargained in M 
compliance) sector l contr cts) ?j 
France 10%) 93% Sector dominant Yes (legal 56.0% 2 2 Rather Low No q 
& firm & quasi- centraliz  ^ 
automatic) 
C/3 
Germany 25% 68% (west) Sector 
dominant 
Yes (but None 4 3 Rather Moderate No ?j 
53% (east) 8c firm rarely used) c ntralized ^ 
Sweden 81 93 Sector 
dominant 
No No (but 3 3 Rather Low No 3 
bargained in centralized ^ 
sectoral contracts) 
Continued 
Table 1. 
Continued. 
Min. Wage Predicted 
Relative to Coord. 
Central. 
Degree Predicted Union 
Union Bargaining Bargaining 
Extension 
Full-Time Index4 Index* of Wage Wage 
Country Densitf Coverage* Level Procedure Median 
Earning? 
(OECD) (OECD) Centralization Dispersion Differential JC 
- o 
Emerging 
Market 
Economies H 
Brazil 16%b 32%b Industry y No 36.0%A Rather Very highY sC/j 
region 
dominant 
decentralized m 
India 26%f NA Industry by No Yes 
(but variable 
NA Decentralized Very high Yes (^ 
region 
dominant 
by fed ral gov) H 
Poland 15% 43% Sector dominant Yes 36% 1 Decentralized Very high Yes O 
(hardship &
firm 
(voluntary ^ 
clause) compliance) ^ 
S. Africa 29%g NA Sector dominant No No 
(but 
bargained NA NA Decentralized Very high Yes Z 
& firm in 
sectoral 
contracts) ^ 
S.Korea 11% 13% Firm-level 
dominant 
No 44.0% 1 1 Rather Very high Yes d 
decentralized 
& 
aThe percentage is based on OECD 
Employment 
Outlook 2004 (except Germany and Brazil). a 
These figures include the formal and informal economy. Union 
membership 
in the formal economy increased in the 1990s, and was 40% in 1999 (U.S. DOL c/3 
2002:8-9). ^ 
cAdult statutory minimum wage (Low Pay Commission, Great Britain, 
2005:237), 
except South Korea and Brazil; figures for Brazil are relative to the average >-} 
wage 
(Carley 
2006:15). g 
dScale for 1995-2004, 
estimated 
by 
OECD (2004); 1 = lowest, 5 = highest. q 
eSources for Israel: 
Cohen 
et 
al. (2003); Mundlak (2007). W 
^This figure is based on data for 1998 (International Labour Organisation 
(2006) 
Trade Union Membership Database, Bureau of Statistics, Geneva, Switzerland). O 
sThis figure includes the formal and informal economy (38% in the 
formal 
sector only) (Labour Market Review 2005: Republic of South Africa). W 
w n H i w Ox <r 
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sector to follow the patterns found by prior 
research. The emerging market countries 
tend to have decentralized IR systems and 
should more closely follow the patterns of 
liberal market economies. 
Among the countries in each group, how 
ever, there are some important institutional 
differences that should be reflected in wage 
patterns. Among liberal economies, the 
United States stands out as having the most 
decentralized system. Each of the other four 
countries has over twice the level of union 
density and bargaining coverage as the United 
States. Historically, Canada (Card and Free 
man 1993) and the United Kingdom have 
had lower wage inequality than the United 
States, although the Thatcher reforms led 
to some increased wage inequality after 
1980 (Card, Lemieux, and Riddle 2003). In 
addition, the union wage premium in the 
United Kingdom has declined sharply as 
union power has fallen (Blanchflower and 
Bryson 2002), while the statutory minimum 
wage system set up in 1999 has raised the 
wage floor. Israel, by contrast, had a strong 
history of corporatist industrial relations and 
labor law based on practices in continental 
Europe, and historically had low levels of 
wage dispersion. Since the 1970s, however, 
the country has relaxed labor laws and de 
centralized collective bargaining?leading 
to large declines in bargaining coverage and 
a growing dominance of individualized em 
ployment contracts (Mundlak2007). Union 
membership fell from over 80% in 1980 to 
35% in 2004 (Mundlak 2007:43). As a re 
sult, Israel's IR system is now characterized 
as quite decentralized. Ireland, by contrast, 
has some characteristics of a coordinated IR 
system, with a combination of firm and sector 
bargaining in some industries and some use 
of voluntary extension clauses; but we classify 
it with liberal market economies because of 
its highly deregulated economy. These differ 
ences among countries in this group suggest 
that wage dispersion and union differentials 
will be highest in the United States and low 
est in Ireland, but in all cases higher than in 
coordinated market economies. 
Among the coordinated economies, dif 
ferences in national IR institutions and the 
approach to the minimum wage (Marginson 
et al. 2003; Schulten et al. 2006) should lead to 
different levels of wage dispersion. Denmark 
and Sweden have retained quite centralized 
systems, with high union density, a mix of 
sectoral and firm-level bargaining, and high 
bargaining coverage. While they have expe 
rienced some decentralization of bargaining, 
this has not led to fragmentation, because 
strong membership levels and an active shop 
steward system allow unions to negotiate ef 
fectively at the firm level. Thus, they retain 
a high level of coordinated activity by large, 
well-organized trade unions and employers' 
confederations (Westergaard-Nielsen 2008). 
France is often classified as having a lower 
level of centralization than other coordinated 
economies because of its low union density 
(which is comparable to that of the United 
States); but this is offset by the predominance 
of sectoral-level bargaining, mandatory ex 
tension of sectoral agreements, and a high 
relative minimum wage that affects 15% of 
all employees (Sellier 1990; Parsons 1995; 
Low Wage Commission 2005). 
Austria also should have low wage dis 
persion and no union wage differentials, 
although some research has shown that 
Austrian unions have traditionally accepted 
a certain level of wage inequality in order to 
achieve other general goals, such as economic 
growth and employment security (Hoist 
2008). However, it has high union density, 
broad bargaining coverage, and mandatory 
extension clauses due in part to obligatory 
membership of Austrian employers in the 
Chamber of Commerce, which negotiates 
collective agreements. 
In contrast to the other countries in this 
group, Germany's union density and bargain 
ing coverage have fallen markedly in recent 
years, due in part to East German unification 
as well as employer decisions to break from 
bargaining agreements that historically were 
based on normative compliance. Reduced 
union power and low union density in many 
sectors have allowed firms to break from prior 
agreements, outsource work, or establish 
"hardship clauses" that allow them to cut 
wages when faced with economic difficulties 
(Bosch and Weinkopf 2008). 
In sum, we expect wage dispersion in 
coordinated economies to be lower than in 
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liberal market economies, but also expect 
differences between Germany and the other 
four coordinated economies. 
The indicators in Table 1 suggest that pat 
terns in emerging market countries are closer 
to those in liberal market than in coordinated 
market countries. All of the emerging market 
countries have relatively low levels of union 
density and collective bargaining coverage 
(Blanchflower 2006). Most of them share a 
legacy of state-controlled industrial relations 
that limited independent union formation 
until democratization movements in the 
1980s; and despite very different histories 
and bargaining structures, their industrial 
relations systems are generally decentralized. 
For example, Brazil's corporatist system 
features strong state involvement in collective 
bargaining as well as legislation governing 
employment protection, benefits, minimum 
wages, and wage indexation (Gonzago 2003). 
However, union leverage in companies is 
weak, with bargaining decentralized to local 
or regional industry and occupational units. 
Union dependence on government funding 
paradoxically creates perverse incentives to 
form local unions, thereby fragmenting work 
ers' organizations; and while labor gained 
important rights in the 1980s, half of union 
contracts have not kept pace with inflation 
(U.S. DOL 2002:18). Poland has experienced 
substantial decline in union density (now at 
14%); and while unions have tried to build 
a sectoral and regional bargaining system 
with extension provisions through a tripar 
tite commission, "hardship clauses" allow 
firms to set lower wage standards (Behrens 
and Traxler 2003). South Korea tripled the 
number of enterprise unions after 1987, but 
almost entirely among core workers in large 
firms (Lee and Lee 2003). The 1997 financial 
crisis led to widespread layoffs, elimination 
of lifetime employment security, a dramatic 
rise in contingent employment, and a 50% 
drop in union density (Kim and Kim 2003). 
Attempts to create labor peace via tripartite 
coordinated bargaining had only limited suc 
cess, and bargaining remains at the enterprise 
level (Lee and Lee 2003). 
Finally, in both India and South Africa, 
the importance of the informal sector con 
tributes to a fragmented labor market and 
a limited scope for labor unions, although 
the legal system of industrial relations was 
established in India in the 1940s, and in South 
Africa after apartheid (Donnelly and Dunn 
2006). In both countries, unions have had 
strength in core sectors (textiles in India and 
mining in South Africa), but have failed to 
build capacity in new sectors, such as IT or 
call centers, which are dominated by foreign 
multinationals. 
In sum, despite large historic differences 
among these countries, the emerging market 
economies in this study share low union den 
sity, decentralized bargaining structures, a 
weak overall union movement punctuated by 
pockets of strength and militancy, economic 
crises in the 1990s that undermined union 
strength, and problems of unemployment 
and a large informal economy that create 
highly segmented labor markets. These 
characteristics suggest that the industrial rela 
tions systems in these countries are not well 
positioned to organize workers and influence 
wage policies in new sector activities such as 
call centers; and we expect high levels of wage 
dispersion. However, beyond this general 
prediction, the institutional literature does 
not provide theoretical guidance on differ 
ences among the countries in this group; we 
explore this issue in the empirical analysis. 
Employer Strategies and 
Industrial Relations Institutions 
Differences in industrial relations institu 
tions also should affect employer organiza 
tional strategies and how these influence wage 
levels. In liberal market economies, employ 
ers face few institutional constraints?even in 
unionized firms, because business strategies 
are not mandatory subjects of bargaining. 
Thus, employers' ability to reorganize work 
and price labor according to its human capital 
or value added content is constrained by little 
other than market pressures. In coordinated 
market countries, by contrast, institutional 
incentives and constraints may shape employ 
ers' approach to doing business. Research 
on German manufacturing, for example, 
has shown that union power coupled with a 
strong education and training system induced 
a "diversified quality production" strategy 
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for competing in global markets (Streeck 
1991). In the context of the current study, 
two important employer strategies affect 
the structure of jobs and pay: operations 
strategies of outsourcing and marketing 
strategies of customer segmentation. Each 
relies on the ability to separate customer 
interactions into discrete tasks that may be 
organized into different skill hierarchies or 
organizational units. 
Outsourcing Strategies 
The outsourcing decisions of firms are 
likely to reflect their strategic choices. In 
theory, firms are likely to outsource less value 
added tasks while retaining in-house their 
"core competencies" that are more central 
to their competitiveness?such as work func 
tions involved in providing unique products 
or services for more value-added customers. 
Thus, the skill requirements of in-house call 
center jobs are likely to be higher than those 
assigned to subcontractors?although differ 
ences may be a matter of degree, because the 
overall variation in skill requirements within 
this class of service jobs is not large. This 
suggests that, in general, subcontractors will 
offer somewhat lower wages than in-house 
operations. 
Differences in the institutional environ 
ment, however, may shape the magnitude of 
differences between in-house and outsourced 
operations and between the wage rates they 
offer. In decentralized industrial relations 
systems, low union density and coverage 
coupled with low levels of employment pro 
tection against dismissals create flexible labor 
market conditions. Employers are free to 
experiment with how they use subcontractors: 
they may shift some moderately complex tasks 
to outsourced operations or create competi 
tive contests between in-house centers and 
subcontractors in an effort to push down 
overall costs. Thus, labor market flexibility 
puts downward pressure on wages in this 
en 
vironment and may lead to a convergence in 
the levels of wages between in-house centers 
and subcontractors. 
In more centralized IR systems, employers 
face a different constellation of incentives 
and constraints that may play out in differ 
ent ways among the countries in this study. 
On the one hand, in centralized systems 
with high union density, such as Denmark 
and Sweden, subcontractors who operate 
outside traditional industry boundaries may 
feel pressure to conform to prevailing wage 
rates. In France, the high minimum wage is 
likely to reduce wage differentials between 
in-house centers and subcontractors. On 
the other hand, normative mechanisms of 
compliance or union power may be insuf 
ficient to deter lower wage rates among 
subcontractors operating outside industry 
boundaries. Among the countries in this 
study, only Austria and France have set up 
sectoral bargaining for call centers, and the 
contract conditions and wage rates are far 
inferior to those found in established indus 
tries (Hoist 2007; Caroli and Gautie 2008). 
In Germany, where the centralized system 
has unraveled to a greater extent, employ 
ers have large incentives and opportunities 
to evade sectoral bargaining by outsourcing 
work to subcontractors, who operate outside 
traditional industry boundaries. In addition, 
because labor market flexibility is limited by 
employment protection laws, employers are 
not as free to shift work between one set of 
operations and another or set up competitive 
contests to lower wages. Thus, in general, 
we expect that wage differences between 
in-house establishments and subcontractors 
will be greater in centralized systems than in 
more decentralized ones in liberal market 
and emerging market economies. 
Segmentation Strategies 
In contrast to outsourcing, employers use 
segmentation strategies to define separate 
groups of customers and to differentiate 
services based on the demand characteris 
tics of each group. Segmenting the market 
facilitates price differentiation strategies by 
customers' value-added or their willingness 
to pay. Segmentation also allows companies 
to set up separate centers for each customer 
group and to match each group's demand 
characteristics to the human capital require 
ments of the job and the human resource 
practices needed to support that job (Batt 
2000). This approach represents a depar 
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ture from geographic-based organizations 
that serve all customers in a given area and 
hire a work force that is broadly skilled and 
undifferentiated by pay (referred to as a 
"universal approach"). 
Segmentation strategies reorganize job 
structures and pay hierarchies according to 
the structure of the customer hierarchy. A 
typical pattern separates operations devoted 
to large business customers from those fo 
cused on small businesses or on the mass or 
general consumer markets. Large business 
centers, with their high value-added services, 
are typically kept in-house, although firms 
may outsource low-value-added telemarket 
ing or transactional services for these business 
clients. Each type of center has different 
skill requirements, but unlike the example of 
outsourcing above, differences between jobs 
in formal education requirements are often 
large. Agents serving business customers 
are often required to have a college degree, 
unlike those working in mass market or "uni 
versal" centers. Under these circumstances, 
labor mobility between business centers 
and other types of centers is reduced. Past 
research has shown that large business cen 
ters in the United States hire mainly college 
graduates and offer a 15-20% wage premium, 
after the analysis controls for human capital 
characteristics (Batt 2001). 
In theory, this type of labor market seg 
mentation based on formal education should 
operate similarly in different institutional 
environments. However, in more central 
ized IR systems, unions and works councils 
may seek to limit the reorganization of work 
based on these principles or the level of dif 
ferentiation in pay when specialized units 
are established. 
Expected Findings 
To summarize our argument, we expect 
that differences in national industrial rela 
tions systems will lead to differences across 
countries in wage dispersion for call center 
workers. First, liberal market countries with 
more decentralized systems will have higher 
wage dispersion and union wage differentials 
than coordinated economies with more 
centralized systems. Second, among liberal 
market economies, we expect higher wage 
dispersion in the United States and lower dis 
persion in Ireland; while among coordinated 
economies, we expect somewhat higher wage 
dispersion in Germany. Wage dispersion 
in the emerging economies should be par 
ticularly large due to their highly segmented 
labor markets and lack of overall employ 
ment protections; we further explore varia 
tion among these countries in our analyses. 
Third, employer strategies of outsourcing and 
segmentation should partially explain wage 
variation within countries. Fourth, in-house 
differentials should be larger in coordinated 
economies than in liberal or emerging market 
economies, while business center differentials 
should be smaller. 
Methods 
The details of the research methodology 
are provided in the introduction to this spe 
cial issue. It discusses the sampling strategy, 
survey construction and administration, 
variable definitions and scales, creation of 
the international data set, and means and 
standard deviations of the variables (by 
country). The study draws on the global call 
center survey, an establishment-level survey 
that reduces heterogeneity by focusing on 
one occupational group in customer services. 
It was administered to the general manager 
of each establishment and covered a series 
of questions regarding market conditions, 
collective bargaining coverage, employer 
strategies, organizational features, human 
capital characteristics, and wages. The survey 
applied to the "core" occupational group? 
that is, the largest group of employees serv 
ing as call center agents. We provide a brief 
summary below and focus on specific issues 
that apply to this paper. 
Sample and Survey Administration 
The sample for this article consists of 1,819 
observations from 15 of the 17 countries in 
the study. The Netherlands and Spain were 
excluded due to missing observations for key 
variables. Every effort was made to take a 
consistent approach to sampling and survey 
administration, but there was some varia 
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tion across countries. In each country, the 
sample was chosen from the largest available 
list of call centers (typically the membership 
list of the national call center employers' 
association), supplemented by other avail 
able sources. Because the population of call 
centers in most countries is small, the samples 
typically represent a large proportion of the 
entire population (with the exception of the 
United States). 
The number of call centers by sector and 
the number by in-house/outsourced status 
in our data appear to be consistent with esti 
mates by other call center surveys. However, 
sampling strategies led to an over-sampling 
of outsourced centers in Germany and an 
over-representation of the telecommunica 
tions industry in the United States. We take 
both of these variables into account in our 
data analyses below. 
While most country surveys were random 
or stratified random samples, the teams in 
emerging market economies did face-to 
face interviews, because mail and telephone 
surveys yield particularly low response rates. 
As a result, the survey teams focused on a 
limited number of geographic areas (for 
example, Seoul in South Korea, and two call 
center cities in South Africa). The teams 
identified the largest list of call centers they 
could find (based on employer association 
lists and telephone books), and administered 
the surveys wherever they could get access to 
establishments. Thus, the samples are large 
and non-random. 
The overall response rate for the countries 
in this paper was 57% (unweighted), and 68% 
(weighted). All countries had a response rate 
of at least 40%, except for Ireland (23%). In 
general, using employers' association lists to 
identify the population of centers biases the 
sample toward the better-operated ones, be 
cause association members tend to be more 
established operators, often part of large or 
multinational corporations. 
Measures 
For wage levels, we asked, "What are the 
gross annual earnings of the typical full 
time core employee? (By 'typical' we mean 
that about half the core employees are paid 
more and about half are paid less)." We 
defined gross annual earnings as total earn 
ings before deductions and taxes, including 
wages, bonuses, commissions, profit sharing, 
and overtime pay, but excluding benefits 
such as pensions and health, and deferred 
compensation such as stock options. We 
converted other currencies to U.S. dollars 
and used the natural log transformation. We 
used the measure of gross annual earnings 
because there is great variation in the use of 
performance-based pay or bonuses, and we 
wanted to capture all earnings regardless of 
pay mix. We asked about the median worker 
because we wanted to capture the wages of 
the typical worker, without the influence of 
particularly high- or low-paid workers in a 
given establishment. Since there are virtu 
ally no centers in which the median worker 
is part-time, this definition allows us to com 
pare full-time workers across countries. The 
disadvantage is that it does not allow us to 
take into consideration wage variation due 
to variation in hours worked or the greater 
use of part-time and contingent workers in 
some countries than in others. Thus, our 
measure is a conservative one. 
The union coverage variable is an indicator 
of whether call center agents are covered by 
a collective bargaining contract. Ownership 
status is a dummy variable that equals 1 for 
in-house centers and 0 for subcontractors. For 
customer segment, we divided the data into 
centers that primarily serve large business and 
centers that serve all others, based on past 
research showing that large business is the 
most important differentiator (Batt 2001). 
We used several measures to capture hu 
man capital and demographic characteristics. 
Three dummy variables measure years of 
education "of the typical or median worker": 
schooling up to age 16 (omitted category), 
schooling up to age 18, and university degree. 
We added a measure of job complexity to 
provide some indication of non-observable 
human capital requirements of the job. Our 
job complexity measure is the number of 
weeks it takes for the typical employee to 
become proficient in the job. We measured 
tasks by whether calls are in-bound (usually 
involving service or service and sales) 
or 
outbound (typically telemarketing types of 
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sales calls). We include the percentage of 
the work force that is female. We also con 
trol for organizational characteristics: size 
(natural log of total employment); percent 
of the work force that is female; age of the 
establishment (logged); and primary sector 
served (financial services, telecommunica 
tions, and all others, the omitted category). 
Data Analytic Strategy 
Our data analysis is in two stages. First, 
we did a series of calculations of overall wage 
dispersion for each country, using several 
indices, including the coefficient of varia 
tion, the standard deviation of logs, and the 
gini coefficient. These statistics are based 
on our establishment-level data, weighted by 
establishment size, and are presented in Table 
3. Second, to examine the relative impor 
tance of collective bargaining and employer 
strategies of segmentation and outsourcing, 
we did a series of multiple regressions using 
the pooled international data set and robust 
standard errors, which provide a Huber cor 
rection for country effect that takes into ac 
count the non-independence of observations 
within each country. Our series of models 
includes the key independent variables and 
different sets of control variables (Table 4). 
We then estimated full models that include 
all of the control variables plus interaction 
terms. Because of the large number of 
countries, we used separate equations to 
examine the country interaction terms for 
our three independent variables (Table 5). 
Finally, we calculated the magnitude of the 
wage differential associated with each of our 
independent variables and whether it was 
statistically significant. We then compared 
the magnitude and significance levels of 
these differentials across our three types of 
economies, and across countries within each 
category (Table 6). 
Results 
The means, standard deviations, and pair 
wise correlations for the data used in this 
paper are provided in Table 2. The means 
and standard deviations, by country, are 
provided in Appendix E of the introduction. 
Wage Dispersion 
The analyses in Table 3 show that among 
the liberal market economies, the United 
States had the lowest bargaining coverage 
and the highest levels of wage dispersion (at 
least twice the size of Denmark's). Canada, 
Ireland, and Israel also had high dispersion, 
but somewhat lower than the United States. 
The United Kingdom had the lowest levels of 
dispersion, intermediate between the liberal 
and coordinated economies. Among the 
emerging market economies, all had high 
or very high levels of dispersion, with Brazil 
having the highest levels of any country in 
the study. 
Among the coordinated economies, 
Austria, Denmark, France, and Sweden had 
relatively high bargaining coverage among 
call center workers (over 60%), compared to 
Germany (34%). Union coverage among sub 
contractors was also high in Austria, France, 
and Sweden, but not Denmark. Because the 
German survey over-sampled subcontractor 
centers, these figures may understate bar 
gaining coverage; however, the differences 
between coverage for in-house centers and 
subcontractors in our data are not statistically 
significant. Denmark, France, and Sweden 
scored the lowest on wage dispersion mea 
sures, while Germany scored high and Austria 
scored very high. 
These findings only partially support our 
predictions. As predicted, wage dispersion 
was higher in most of the liberal and emerging 
market economies than in the coordinated 
economies; and it was very high in the United 
States and most emerging market countries. 
However, Ireland had higher wage dispersion 
than expected, and the United Kingdom 
had lower dispersion. Similarly, while we 
predicted that Germany would diverge from 
the coordinated group, it had much higher 
levels of wage dispersion than we expected; 
and Austrian figures resemble those of the 
United States. 
Differentials Based on Union 
Coverage and Employer Strategies 
We now turn to our analyses that examine 
the relative importance of bargaining cover 
age and employer strategies of outsourcing 
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Table 3. Wage Dispersion a d the Union Wage Premium in Call Centers, by Country. 
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All Work Call House Sub- of 
Deviation 
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Variation 
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Liberal Market Economies ^ 
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Table 4. Log Annual Earnings (Robust SE). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Institutions and Strategies 
CB Coverage 0.080 0.057 0.069 0.057 0.088 0.054 
In-House Center 0.206 0.035*** 0.148 0.033*** 0.123 0.024*** 
Business Center 0.142 0.093 0.123 0.068 0.102 0.059 
Human Capital Characteristics 
Job Complexity 0.071 0.012*** 0.073 0.013*** 
Inbound Tasks 0.049 0.050 0.050 0.049 
Education: 18 Years 0.149 0.054* 0.126 0.044* 
Education: University 0.326 0.091*** 0.272 0.066*** 
Organizational Characteristics 
Size -0.042 0.010*** 
Percent Female -0.003 0.001*** 
Age of Center 0.050 0.013*** 
Sector: Fin. Serv. 0.016 0.019 
Sector: Telecom 0.033 0.025 
Countries 
Liberal Market 
Canada 0.027 0.014 -0.039 0.015* 0.000 0.016 
Ireland -0.059 0.015*** -0.127 0.021*** -0.119 0.017*** 
Israel -1.211 0.012*** -1.147 0.014*** -1.120 0.021*** 
U.K. -0.129 0.022*** -0.170 0.025*** -0.132 0.025*** 
Coordinated 
Austria -0.539 0.032*** -0.412 0.047*** -0.385 0.040*** 
Denmark 0.313 0.023*** 0.301 0.019*** 0.304 0.019*** 
France -0.364 0.037*** -0.496 0.056*** -0.469 0.044*** 
Germany -0.233 0.024*** -0.132 0.042** -0.121 0.034*** 
Sweden -0.078 0.051 -0.124 0.050* -0.127 0.039** 
Emerging Market 
Brazil -2.038 0.044*** -1.959 0.054*** -1.885 0.058*** 
India -2.408 0.023*** -2.554 0.042*** -2.499 0.055*** 
Poland -1.441 0.016*** -1.487 0.019*** -1.485 0.021*** 
S.Africa -0.977 0.009*** -0.858 0.033*** -0.888 0.026*** 
S.Korea -0.788 0.024*** -0.818 0.020*** -0.695 0.034*** 
Constant 10.117 0.040*** 9.801 0.073*** 10.053 0.087*** 
Sample 1,819 1,819 1,819 
R-Squared_0.818_0.840_0.851_ 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level; ***at the .001 level. 
and segmentation. Table 4 shows the results 
from regression models that control for 
country effects as well as human capital and 
organizational variables. Table 5 includes 
the country interaction terms, and Table 6 
provides the calculations of wage differentials 
based on these regression analyses. Results in 
Table 4 show that, for the dataset as a whole, 
the distinction between in-house centers and 
subcontractors is statistically significant in all 
of the equations, but the influence of unions 
and segmentation strategies is not. Several 
of the human capital and organizational 
control variables are statistically significant 
in the expected direction. Their addition 
does not change the significance level, but 
lowers the size of the coefficient on in-house 
centers from 21 % in the model with country 
controls to 12% in the full model. 
Results relevant to country-level differ 
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Table 5. Log Wage Regressions with Interaction Terms (Robust SE). 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE 
Institutions and Strategies 
CB Coverage -0.015 0.029 0.096 0.050 0.085 0.051 
In-House Center 0.115 0.020*** 0.233 0.024*** 0.122 0.023*** 
Business Center 0.105 0.058 0.108 0.057 0.036 0.015* 
Country Interactions Union Interactions In-House Interactions Segment Interactions 
Liberal Market 
Canada 0.246 0.041*** -0.102 0.020*** 0.006 0.013 
Ireland 0.284 0.062*** 0.215 0.022*** 
Israel 0.034 0.030 -0.230 0.029*** -0.065 0.011*** 
U.K. 0.022 0.034 -0.206 0.017*** 0.052 0.015*** 
U.S. 0.229 0.041*** -0.150 0.036*** 0.295 0.014*** 
Coordinated 
Austria -0.005 0.043 -0.034 0.020 0.028 0.015 
Denmark 0.093 0.042* -0.155 0.023*** 0.035 0.025 
France 0.020 0.024 -0.167 0.021*** 0.020 0.010 
Germany 0.313 0.051*** 0.029 0.020 -0.130 0.014*** 
Sweden -0.040 0.043 (DR) 
Emerging Market 
Brazil -0.257 0.037*** 0.124 0.052* -0.141 0.026*** 
India -0.164 0.024*** -0.031 0.009*** 
Poland -0.261 0.026*** -0.046 0.021* 
S.Africa 0.029 0.022 -0.202 0.016*** -0.175 0.020*** 
S.Korea 0.297 0.033*** -0.169 0.016*** -0.015 0.037 
HC Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Organization Ctrls. Yes Yes es 
Country Controls Yes Yes es 
Constant 10.058 0.088*** 10.077 0.089*** 9.982 0.092*** 
Sample 1,819 1,819 1,819 
R Squared 0.857 0.854 0.857 
RootMSE 0.297 0.300 .296 
* 
Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 level; ***at the .001 level. 
ences are shown in Table 5. The models 
replicate the full model in Table 4, but add 
country interaction terms. Model 1 includes 
interaction terms for the union effect, model 
2 for the in-house effect, and model 3 for the 
segmentation effect. Again, in Table 5, only 
the coefficient on in-house centers remains 
statistically significant and large in all of the 
models. Most of the human capital, organiza 
tional controls, and country interaction terms 
are also statistically significant. The omitted 
category is the United States. In analyses not 
shown, we included additional controls?for 
example, tenure of the work force, whether 
the establishment was part of a larger orga 
nization, and whether the center primarily 
served an international market?but these 
did not change the results and reduced our 
sample sizes in several countries, so we did 
not include them in the final analyses. 
Our main hypotheses considered the effect 
of three factors on wage differentials: collec 
tive bargaining (CB) coverage, in-house ver 
sus subcontractor status, and centers serving 
business customers versus other customers. 
We also hypothesized that union wage differ 
entials and business center differentials would 
be smaller in coordinated economies than 
in liberal or emerging market economies, 
while in-house differentials would be larger. 
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Table 6. Within-Country Wage 
Differentials: Collective Bargaining 
Coverage and Business Strategies. 
Union In-House Business 
Country Differential Differential Differential 
LME 0.156* 0.098*** 0.185** 
Canada 0.231*** 0.132*** 0.042*** 
Ireland 0.268*** 0.233*** 0.250*** 
Israel 0.019 0.003 -0.030** 
U.K. 0.007 0.027 0.088*** 
U.S. 0.215*** 0.083*** 0.331*** 
CME 0.081 0.146** 0.004 
Austria -0.020 0.199*** 0.063** 
Denmark 0.078*** 0.078* 0.070* 
France 0.005 0.066* 0.055** 
Germany 0.297*** 0.262*** -0.095*** 
Sweden 0.193*** 0.036* 
EME -0.118 0.157 -0.074* 
Brazil -0.272*** 0.358*** -0.106*** 
India 0.069*** 0.005 
Poland -0.015 -0.028 -0.011 
S.Africa 0.014 0.031* -0.139*** 
S.Korea 0.282*** 0.064*** 0.020 
*Statistically significant at the .05 level; **at the .01 
level; ***at the .001 level. 
To test these hypotheses, we calculated 
the country-specific wage differentials (for 
union, in-house, and business segment 
status) by adding the coefficients on the 
main independent variable (for example, 
union) and the country interaction term 
(for example, Austria*union) from Table 5. 
This yields the (union) wage differential for 
each country. We also ran a series of regres 
sions (not shown) with dummy variables for 
the union and non-union category in each 
country (with U.S. non-union as the omit 
ted category). Subtracting the non-union 
category from the union category produces 
the same results. (We report the analyses 
with interaction terms because they take up 
considerably less space.) Finally, we tested 
whether the union and non-union dummies 
for each country were statistically signifi 
cantly different. We did the same analysis 
for in-house center and the business segment 
dummies. We also did this set of analyses for 
the categories of coordinated, liberal, and 
emerging market economies; the results 
are 
presented in Table 6. 
The results show that the union wage dif 
ferential was large (15.6%) and statistically 
significant for liberal market economies? 
particularly Canada, Ireland, and the United 
States?but insignificant for coordinated 
economies. These results are consistent 
with predictions based on past research. For 
emerging markets as a group, there was no 
consistent union wage effect. More impor 
tant, variation among the countries in each of 
these categories is noteworthy. Among liberal 
market countries, the United Kingdom and 
Israel had no statistically significant union 
premium, and thus resemble the coordinated 
economies more than the liberal ones. By 
contrast, Germany diverged substantially 
from the coordinated pattern, with an esti 
mated differential of 29.7%?higher than 
in most of the liberal market economies. 
Denmark also had a statistically significant, 
but much smaller, union differential (7.8%). 
Among emerging market economies, the 
cross-national patterns were widely differ 
ent, with a statistically significant negative 
differential in Brazil and a positive one in 
Korea. We explored various models with 
alternative controls, but the negative union 
coefficient in Brazil remained robust in al 
most all estimations. We believe it is related 
to unions being concentrated in centers and 
sectors that were lower-paying to begin with. 
In addition, Brazilian call centers included a 
large number of multinational centers, owned 
by Spanish telecommunications companies 
among others, and these paid higher wages 
than Brazilian-owned centers serving the 
domestic market, but were rarely unionized. 
The wage premium for in-house centers 
compared to subcontractors, by contrast, 
was positive and statistically significant in all 
but three countries in the study. Moreover, 
it is noteworthy that all of the coordinated 
market countries had at least some wage 
premium for in-house centers, and several 
had larger in-house differentials than did 
liberal or emerging market countries. For 
example, Austria, Sweden, and Germany 
had particularly large differentials (19-26%) 
compared to Israel and the United Kingdom 
(non-significant), the United States (8.3%), 
and India, Poland, South Africa, or South 
Korea (ranging from insignificant to 7%). 
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This is suggestive that there may be more 
incentives in coordinated economies than in 
others to use subcontracting to lower wages 
and a more structured institutional divide 
between in-house centers and subcontractors. 
Significant wage premia for centers serving 
business clients were also widespread, but 
there was no consistent difference between 
countries in the three groups of economies. 
The United States and Ireland stand out as 
having quite large wage differentials, on aver 
age 33% and 25%, respectively; but most of 
the other countries had small differentials, 
in the range of 3-9%. In addition, in four of 
the countries in the study?Germany, Israel, 
Brazil, and South Africa?business centers 
paid significantly less than other centers 
(ranging from 3% in Israel to 10-14% in the 
other three countries). We know from field 
research that some business-to-business cen 
ters are set up exclusively to handle the most 
transactional work for these clients, and this 
would explain why some business-to-business 
centers in our study had low wages; however, 
we do not have an institutional explanation 
for why we find this pattern in some countries 
versus others?particularly as these countries 
differ so dramatically in their institutional 
arrangements. 
These findings regarding union coverage 
and employer strategies are statistically signifi 
cant after we control for a range of human 
capital and organizational characteristics of 
the establishments in the study. Most of the 
human capital and organizational controls 
are statistically significant in the expected 
direction and do explain some of the variance 
in wages, except for the emerging market 
countries. 
In general, these results show that there was 
considerable wage flexibility at the establish 
ment level across most of the countries in the 
study, including the coordinated economies. 
They also show that the general categories of 
liberal, coordinated, and emerging market 
systems are of only limited value for explain 
ing patterns of wage variation in this sector. 
Rather, we find a small number of countries 
with relatively small wage dispersion and in 
stitutional resilience (Denmark, France, and 
Sweden) among a much larger number that 
showed considerable wage dispersion and 
wage differentials based on union coverage 
and business strategies of outsourcing and 
segmentation. The statistically significant 
difference in wages between in-house cen 
ters and subcontractors is perhaps the most 
consistent finding in the study, although the 
range of variation in the magnitude of the 
differential across countries is large. 
Discussion and Conclusions 
In this study, we examined the interplay 
between existing industrial relations systems 
and the emergence of a new set of economic 
activities. We focused on the growth of call 
centers because they represent a serious 
challenge to existing collective bargaining 
institutions: they are highly mobile opera 
tions and are ideally suited to escape from 
existing institutional rules based on tradi 
tionally defined sectors. Many operate in a 
limbo between historically defined industry 
boundaries, and unions in most countries 
have found it difficult to organize or represent 
workers in these new organizations. 
Our findings may be summarized as fol 
lows. First, in the coordinated economies 
that continue to have relatively centralized 
bargaining systems?primarily Denmark, 
France, and Sweden?we found that collec 
tive bargaining coverage was high, and wage 
dispersion in call centers followed past pat 
terns and was relatively low. These countries 
also had small or statistically insignificant 
union wage differentials. This group shows 
the most institutional resilience in the face 
of this new set of economic activities. Austria 
and Germany, by contrast, resemble the lib 
eral and emerging market countries in their 
level of overall wage dispersion; and Germany 
(but not Austria) had a large union wage 
premium rivaling that in the United States. 
These differences between Denmark, France, 
and Sweden on the one hand, and Austria 
and Germany on the other, are consistent 
with recent research on wage patterns in 
these countries (Westergard-Nielsen 2008; 
Caroli and Gautie 2008; Hoist 2008; Bosch 
and Weinkopf 2008). 
Second, consistent with past research, wage 
dispersion in liberal market economies was 
high, with the highest levels in the United 
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States and Canada. However, Ireland's dis 
persion was higher than expected, while the 
United Kingdom's level was intermediate 
between the liberal and coordinated market 
groups. The United Kingdom and Israel also 
had no statistically significant union wage 
premium in this sector. The U.K. findings 
are consistent with recent studies based on 
national wage data (for example, Card et al. 
2003; Bryson 2002). The U.K. pattern maybe 
explained by the relatively weak bargaining 
power of unions, as well as the possibility that 
U.K. unions have focused on strengthening 
training and raising the wages at the bottom 
via the introduction and enhancement of the 
National Minimum Wage law. The Israeli 
pattern may be explained by the continued 
influence of some corporatist traditions, 
despite the extensive deregulation of labor 
markets that has occurred in that country. 
Third, all of the emerging market countries 
had high or very high wage dispersion in this 
sector, as expected. Beyond that, however, the 
results are nationally specific and difficult to 
interpret. As stated earlier, our goal in this 
paper was to explore how wage patterns in 
the emerging market countries compared to 
those in advanced economies, as the sector 
has become increasingly international; but 
past research provides insufficient guidance 
for specific predictions. Our results point to 
the need for more country-specific research 
and development of theory for each of these 
countries. For example, while some research 
suggests that South Korea has moved toward 
a more coordinated system, the high levels 
of dispersion and high union wage premium 
suggest that this is not the case, at least for 
this sector. Specific features of this sector 
in emerging markets also are undoubtedly 
important, including the effects of off-shoring 
brought by multinationals combined with the 
importance of the informal sector, which may 
create a unique path of industrial develop 
ment for this sector in each country. 
Fourth, an important source of wage varia 
tion in almost all countries in this study was 
employers' choice of subcontracting strat 
egy. Surprisingly, even among coordinated 
economy countries with relatively centralized 
bargaining, significant differences in wage 
levels existed based on whether the center 
remained in the primary firm or was owned 
and operated by subcontractors. The growth 
of subcontracting has been an important 
phenomenon across many industries in 
recent decades. The findings in this study 
suggest that there is a convergence in em 
ployer strategies of subcontracting across 
countries, which is producing a consistent 
source of wage differentiation within each 
country. This pattern is consistent with 
recent arguments that employer practices 
are converging across countries, which 
produces divergent wage outcomes within 
countries (Katz and Darbishire 2000). 
The findings signal that subcontracting is 
an important new source of labor market 
segmentation in this sector. 
There are important limitations to this 
study that are discussed more fully in the 
introduction to this volume. The central 
methodological challenge was defining the 
population of call centers and obtaining a 
nationally representative sample of estab 
lishments. For this paper on wage determi 
nation, we believe that there is an upward 
bias in wage levels in our sample because it 
principally drew from employers' association 
lists, in which large corporations with more 
sophisticated HR practices tend to be over 
represented. If so, then our data on wages 
should be truncated at the lower end, bias 
ing wage level estimates up and dispersion 
estimates down. 
The dataset is based on the survey re 
sponses of one person in each center, which 
potentially introduces more error into the 
data than if multiple respondents had been 
surveyed. This also creates problems of 
single-source bias. This problem may be 
minimized both because the worksites were 
generally small (the median size was 50 
core employees) and because research has 
found that single-respondent bias is lower for 
establishment-level surveys than for surveys 
of larger organizational units (Gerhart et al. 
2000). The survey also sought answers to 
objective questions (for example, whether 
collective bargaining was present or absent), 
rather than subjective opinions. 
Furthermore, we are aware of the difficul 
ties inherent in all international comparative 
research. A standardized questionnaire 
re 
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duces the ability to capture national diversity, 
differences in meaning for the same variable 
cross-nationally, and norms that are specific to 
one country but are unobserved. In addition, 
the cross-sectional analysis in this case limits 
our ability to make causal inferences. We can 
only demonstrate whether these relationships 
varied across countries and whether the find 
ings are consistent with existing theories. 
We think there is reasonable evidence that 
variation in wages was influenced by the role 
of unions and the actions of business actors 
in this sector. 
We also are aware of the fact that at the 
time of this study, this new sector was at 
different stages of development among 
these countries. The management models 
at call centers might have been relatively 
mature in the United States and United 
Kingdom, and more experimental in the 
EU continental countries, where the sector 
was newer. Similarly, in emerging markets, 
the sector expanded dramatically after 2000, 
influenced by multinational off-shoring and 
new entrants to the field. Thus, the future of 
its institutional evolution remains uncertain, 
and there is need for longitudinal research 
on this question. 
More generally, this study identifies wide 
spread patterns of wage flexibility at the 
establishment level based on union coverage 
and employer strategies, even among some 
coordinated economies with traditional 
patterns of low wage dispersion. We find 
patterns of institutional divergence and 
resilience among a small number of coordi 
nated economies amidst a wider pattern of 
convergence toward more liberal or flexible 
labor market regimes. These findings are 
specific to the emerging call center sector, 
but may also apply to other IT-based occupa 
tions with similar characteristics. However, 
while we have identified general patterns of 
wage flexibility in this sector, understanding 
formal national institutions and coordination 
mechanisms is only a first step. This approach 
must be combined with more fine-grained 
institutional analysis (Maurice, Sellier, and 
Silvestre 1986; Sorge 2005) to grasp the real 
meaning of the interplay between collective 
representation, institutional rules, and em 
ployer strategies in these new sector activities. 
REFERENCES 
Batt, Rosemary. 2000. "Strategic Segmentation and 
Frontline Services: Matching Customers, Employees, 
and Human Resource Systems." International Journal of 
Human Resource Management, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 540-61. 
_. 2001. "Explaining Intra-Occupational Wage In 
equality in Telecommunications Services: Customer 
Segmentation, Human Resource Practices, and Union 
Decline." Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 54, 
No. 2A, pp. 425-49. 
Behrens, Martin, and Franz Traxler. 2003. "Collective 
Bargaining Coverage and Extension Procedures." EIR 
Observer, February, S. i-viii. 
Blanchflower, David. 2006. "A Cross-Country Study 
of Union Membership." IZA DP Discussion Paper 
Series, March. 
Blanchflower, David, and Alex Bryson. 2002. "Changes 
over Time in Union Relative Wage Effects in the UK 
and the US Revisited." NBER Working Paper No. 
9395, December. 
Blau,Francine, and Lawrence Kahn. 1999. "Institutions 
and Laws in the Labor Market." In Orley Ashenfelter 
and David Card, eds., Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 
3, Chap. 25. Amsterdam: Elsevier. 
Bosch, Gerhard, and Claudia Weinkopf, eds. 2008. 
Low Wage Work in Germany. New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation. 
Brown, William, Paul Marginson, and Janet Walsh. 
2003. "The Management of Pay as the Influence of 
Collective Bargaining Diminishes." In Paul Edwards, 
ed., Industrial Relations: Theory and Practice in Britain, 
2nd ed., pp 189-213. Oxford, England: Blackwell. 
Bryson,Alex. 2002. "The Union Membership Wage Pre 
mium: An Analysis Using Propensity Score Matching." 
Centre for Economic Performance paper, London 
School of Economics, January. 
Calmfors, Lars, and John Driffil. 2002. "Centralization 
of Wage Bargaining." In Alison Booth, ed., TheEconom 
ics of Labor Unions, Vol. 2, pp. 353-97. International 
Library of Critical Writings in Economics, Vol. 147. 
Cheltenham, U.K., and Northampton, Mass.: Elgar. 
Card, David, and Richard Freeman, eds. 1993. Small 
Differences That Matter: Labor Markets and Income 
Maintenance in Canada and the United States. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Card, David, Thomas Lemieux, and W. Craig Riddell. 
2004. "Unionization and Wage Inequality." Journal 
552 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
of Labor Research, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Fall), pp. 519-62. 
Carley, Mark. 2006. "Key Themes in Global Industrial 
Relations: Minimum Wages and Relocation of Produc 
tion." European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions. Luxembourg: Office 
of Official Publications of the European Union. 
Caroli, Eve, and Jerome Gautie, eds. 2008. Low Wage 
Work in France. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
Cohen, Yinon, Yitzhak Haberfeld, Guy Mundlak, and 
Ishak Saporta. 2003. "Unpacking Union Density: 
Membership and Coverage in the Transformation 
of the Israeli IR System." Industrial Relations, Vol. 42, 
No. 4, pp. 692-711. 
Donnelly, Eddy, and Stephen Dunn. 2006. "Ten Years 
After: South African Employment Relations Since the 
Negotiated Revolution." British Journal of Industrial 
Relations, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 1-29. 
Gerhart, Barry, Patrick Wright, Gary McMahan, and 
Scott Snell. 2000. "Measurement Error in Research 
on the Human Resources and Firm Performance 
Relationship: How Much Error Is There and How 
Does It Influence Effect Size Estimates?" Personnel 
Psychology, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 803-34. 
Gonzaga, Gustavo. 2003. "Labor Turnover and Labor 
Legislation in Brazil." Economia (Fall), pp. 165-222. 
Hall, Peter, and David Soskice. 2001. Varieties of Capital 
ism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advan 
tage. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Holman, David, Rosemary Batt, and Ursula Holtgrewe. 
2007. "The Global Call Center Report: International 
Perspectives on Management and Employment." URL: 
www.globalcallcenter.org. 
Hoist, Hoja. 2008. "The Political Economy of Trade 
Union Strategies in Austria and Germany: The Case of 
Call Centres." European Journal of Industrial Relations, 
Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 25-45. 
Katz, Harry, and Owen Darbishire. 2000. Converging 
Divergences: Worldwide Changes in Employment Systems. 
Ithaca, N.Y: ILR Press (an imprint of Cornell Uni 
versity Press). 
Kim, Dong-One, and Seongsu Kim. 2003. "Globaliza 
tion, Financial Crisis, and Industrial Relations: The 
Case of South Korea." Industrial Relations, Vol. 42, 
No. 3, pp. 341-67. 
Republic of South Africa, Department of Labour. 2005. 
Labour Market Review 2005. www.labour.gov.za. 
Lee, Won-Duck, and Byoung Hoon Lee. 2003. "Will 
the Model of Uncoordinated Decentralization Persist? 
Change in Korean Industrial Relations after the Fi 
nancial Crisis." In Harry C. Katz, Won-Duck Lee, and 
JooheeLee, The New Structure ojLaborRelations. Ithaca, 
N.Y.: ILR Press (an imprint of Cornell University Press). 
Low Pay Commission, Great Britain. 2005. "National 
Minimum Wage: Low Pay Commission Report 2005." 
Marginson, Paul, James Arrowsmith, and Keith Sisson. 
2003. "Between Decentralization and Europeaniza 
tion: Sectoral Bargaining in Four Countries and Two 
Sectors." European Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 
9, No. 2, pp. 163-87. 
Maurice, Marc, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Sil 
vestre. 1986. The Social Foundations of Industrial Power. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Mundlak, Guy. 2007. "Fading Corporatism: Israel's 
Labor Law and Industrial Relations Tradition." Ithaca 
and London: ILR Press (an imprint of Cornell Uni 
versity Press). 
OECD. 1997. "Economic Performance and the Structure 
of Collective Bargaining." OECD Employment Outlook, 
Chap. 3, pp. 63-92. Paris. 
_. 2004. "Wage Setting Institutions and Outcomes." 
OECD Employment Outlook, Chap. 3, pp. 128-77. Paris. 
Parsons, Nick. 1995. French Industrial Relations in the 
New World Economy. London: Routledge. 
Schulten, Thorsten, Reinhard Bispinck, and Claus 
Schafer. 2006. Minimum Wages in Europe. Brussels: 
European Trade Union Institute (ETUI-REHS). 
Sellier, Francois. 1990. "L'evolution des regies sur les 
salaires dans le systeme francais de relations profes 
sionnelles." Injean-Daniel Reynaud, Francois Eyraud, 
Cathrine Paradeise, and Jean Saglio, eds., Les Systemes 
de Relations Professionnelles. Paris: Editions du CNRS. 
Sorge, Arndt. 2005. The Global and the Local: Under 
standing the Dialectics of Business. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Streeck, Wolfgang. 1991. "On the Institutional Con 
ditions of Diversified Quality Production." In Egon 
Matzner and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., Beyond Keynesian 
ism: The Socio-Economics ofProduction andFullEmployment, 
pp. 21-61. Aldershot: Edward Elgar. 
U.S. Department of Labor. 2002. "Foreign Labor 
Trends: Brazil." Washington: U.S. DOL, Bureau of 
International Labor Affairs. FLT 02-04. 
Westergaard-Nielsen, Niels, ed. 2008. Low Wage Work in 
Denmark. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. 
